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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
First Issue: Did the district court err in its application of the civil ~ 
stalking statute by focusing primarily on an incident that was not directed 
at the Petitioner, and by failing to adequately take into account the parties' ~ 
business relationship? 
Standard of Review: The proper interpretation and application of a 
statute is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, affording no 
deference to the district court's legal conclusion. Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 8, 
,r 16, 322 P.3d 728. 
Preservation: Counsel for Mr. Barnes emphasized the importance of 
the parties' business relationship at several points during the evidentiary 
hearing. See, e.g., R. 65:8;7-18; 167:23-24 ( explaining that the parties' "had 
reason and purpose to be in contact with one another" as a result of their 
"landlord-tenant relationship"). 
Second Issue: Did the district court err by prohibiting Mr. Barnes from 
owning or possessing a firearm for three years? 
Standard of Review: Whether a district court has improperly denied 
a person's constitutional rights is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ,r 25, 100 P.3d 1177 ("Constitutional issues 
... are questions of law that we review for correctness."), abrogated on other 
grounds by State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P~3d 645. 
Preservation: Mr. Barnes preserved this issue during the evidentiary 
hearing below and in his objections to Mr. Carson's proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. R. 65:8:22-23; 9:2-4; 134:5-6; R. 38. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following legal authorities can be found in Addendum B. 
Utah Code§ 77-3a-101 
Utah Code§ 76-5-106.5 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 6 
Utah Code§ 53-5A-102 
Utah Code§ 76-10-503 
U.S. Const. amend. II 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of Facts 
In September 2013, Randy Hunt, as landlord, and a company called 
TCM Bertha, LLC, as tenant, entered into a lease agreement for 
approximately forty acres of land in Tooele County. Pl. Ex. 1. Tim Carson, 
Bertha's principal and owner, signed-the agreement on Bertha's behalf. Id.; ~ 
R. 65:81:14-15. Under the terms of the agreement, Bertha was required to, 
among other things, (1) "ins~re the Premises" and (2) provide an "estoppel C..; 
certificate" within "ten (10) day$" of the "Landlord's request." Pl. Ex. 1, 
,r,r 5, 22. Furthermore, Bertha was required to "permit inspection of the ~ 
Premises during reasonable business hours by Landlord." Pl. Ex. 1, ,r 12. 
At the time the lease was in effect, Bertha operated as some kind of '1 
mining company that would engage in "sampling." R. 65:81:11-13. To 
support that operation, Mr. Carson set up generators, 11 crushers," and 
related equipment on the property. R. 65:82:1-6. Mr. Carson claimed that 
he had not had an opportunity to get things going before vacating the 
property, but, upon his departure, thirty buckets of II ore" were left on the 
property. R. 65:83:4-6; 85:9-12. 
3 
In May 2014, Tom Barnes, a 72-year old Navy veteran and landowner 
of rural properties in Florida, Texas, and Utah, R. 65:114:11-13, purchased 
the property from Mr. Hunt. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Barnes wrote a letter to 
Mr. Carson, asking that Mr. Carson provide the proof of insurance and the 
estoppel certificate required under paragraphs 5 and 22 of the agreement. 
Resp. Ex. 2. Despite Mr. Barnes' request, Mr. Carson never provided proof 
of insurance or a proper estoppel certificate. R. 65:80:16-17; 118:9-10. 
A gravel road runs from Highway 36 to the leased property. Large 
gates stand between the gravel road and the leased property, but the gates 
themselves are not located on the leased property. R. 65:137:14-17. To deal 
with trespassers, a common problem facing property owners in sparse rural 
areas, Mr. Barnes frequently emphasized to Mr. Carson the importance of 
"locking the gates." R. 65:136:9-13. While at the property, however, Mr. 
VJ> Carson refused to lock the gates, insisting that he and Mr. Barnes had 
reached no such "agreement." R. 65:100:21-24. 
Another problem for property owners in sparse rural areas is the lack 
of protection from wild animals,. trespassers, or criminals. R. 65:139:24-
~ 140:10. To protect himself and his wife while on his properties, Mr. Barnes 
carries a pistol. R. 65:130:1-15. While serving in the Navy, Mr. Barnes was 
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trained in the use of various firearms, and for eight years prior to the entry 
of this injunction, Mr. Barnes had a concealed-carry permit, which required 
him to undergo firearms training. R. 65:131:2-18. Fortunately, he has never 
had to "fire[]" the gun he carries. R. 65:130:25-131:1. 
On the night of October 27, 2014, at around 7:00 p.m., Mr. Barnes and 
his wife drove down to the property. Upon their arrival, they noticed that 
the gates "were open" and that the locks on the gates had "been removed." 
R. 65:128:4-6 .. Concerned, they drove up to the building. They saw a "black 
sedan" parked out front and two people they did not recognize-a man and 
a woman-working on a "piece of machinery." R. 65:128:7-12. Mr. Barnes 
instructed the couple to leave. After doing s~, he asked the couple where 
the locks were, to which they responded, "in the building." R. 65:128:17-18. ~ 
Mr. Barnes checked the building but did not see the locks to the gates, so he 
again asked the couple where the locks were. Rather than simply turn over w 
the locks, the couple locked their car (where the locks were located), R. 
65:128:24-25, and said they wouldn't tum them over unless Mr. Barnes GJ 
promised not to lock them in, R. 65:26:24-25. 
Mr. Barnes threatened to call the sheriff, at which point the woman ~ 
returned to the car, unlocked it, and reached inside. R. 65:27:3-4; 129:6-8 . 
.I 
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Mr. Barnes, concerned for his own safety and that of his wife, pulled his gun 
from his car and again asked the couple to tum over the locks. R. 65:129:19-
130:5. They finally did so. R. 65:130:5. Mr. Barnes took the locks and the 
couple left.1 Throughout this exchange, Mr. Carson never made an 
appearance. He had left four hours earlier. R. 65:33:12-15. Mr. Barnes 
attempted several calls to Mr. Carson to report what had happened. R. 
65:132:2-6; 133:6-7. 
About a week later, Mr. Carson and others started moving equipment 
off the property. R. 65:46:19-23; 47:5-6. Mr. Barnes came down to the 
property, got out of his car, and walked toward Mr. Carson. Mr. Carson told 
Mr. Barnes that if Mr. Barnes was .(Ja younger man," Mr. Carson would 
"whoop" his "butt." R. 65:29:17-20. The next day, Mr. Barnes drove down 
to the property to see what was going on, and noticed that Mr. Carson was 
.J moving out more equipment. As Mr. Barnes started to leave, he was blocked 
by a pickup and trailer. R. 65:120:18-20. The police were called, and 
~ eventually Mr. Barnes was allowed to leave. R. 65:121:7-9. He drove to the 
1 In connection with this incident, Mr. Barnes entered pleas in abeyance 
v; to two misdemeanor counts of reckless endangerment. Both counts were 
dismissed on June 19, 2015, and the case was closed. See Docket Report, 
Case No. 141300512, attached at Addendum C. 
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Hampton Inn, where he was staying. While parked there, he saw two 
pickups and trailers drive by with equipment that had been removed from 
the property~ R. 65:121:12-16. Mr. Barnes knew that, under the agreement, 
"[a]ny alterations or improvements to the Premises" could not be removed 
from the property, Pl. Ex. 1, 110, R. 65:124:16-18, so, out of "curio[sity]," he 
and his wife followed the pickups and trailers for about "a mile," R. 
65:121 :13-15. 
Based on Mr. Carson's failure to provide proof of insurance and an 
estoppel certificate as required by the lease, Mr. Barnes considered Mr. 
Carson a" noncompliant lessee." R. 65:118:13-14. Prior to November 6, 2014, 
Mr. Barnes contacted an attorney to assist him with the "process" of evicting 
Mr. Carson from the property. R. 65:118:23-25. Mr. Barnes had previously ~ 
sent Mr. Carson a letter, addressing it to a P.O. Box. Resp. Ex. 2. Mr. 
Carson's rent checks contained a street address in the top left corner. On ~ 
November 6, Mr. Barnes drove by that address to verify its accuracy. In 
doing so, he drove right by Mr. Carson. R. 65:119:10-14. Mr. Carson flipped· ~ 
around and followed Mr. Barnes for "20 or 30 minutes" despite repeated 
requests from a 911 operator to stop. R. 65:119:15-21; 157-63 ("Dispatcher: 
7 
Why are you following him?"; "Dispatcher: First of all, I need you to stop 
following him."; "Dispatcher: I don't want you to follow him any longer."). 
Statement of Proceedings 
On November 7, Mr. Carson filed a request for a civil stalking 
injunction. R. 1. As" stalking events," Mr. Carson identified the events from 
November 4 and 6. R. 2. Under the request for "other stalking events," Mr. 
Carson referred to four police reports he had attached. R. 2. Three of the 
four reports Mr. Carson attached, however, involved Mr. Barnes' request for 
the police to keep the peace. R. 8, 10, 13. The other report did not involve 
Mr. Carson. R. 11. Mr. Carson also did not mention in his initial filing that 
Mr. Barnes allegedly "put his finger" in Mr. Carson's chest on November 3. 
~ R. 65:86:8-13. 
Three days later, on November 10, the court signed and issued a 
l.iP Temporary Civil Stalking Injunction-which constituted an Ex Parte 
Order-prohibiting Mr. Barnes from "stalking" Mr. Carson, from contacting 
..;) Mr. Carson, and ordering Mr. Barnes to "stay away" from Mr. Carson. R. 
15. In addition, the order stated as follows: 
No guns or firearms! It is a federal crime for you to 
have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm 
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or ammunition, including hunting weapons, while 
this civil stalking injunction is in effect. 
R. 16. Mr. Barnes requested a hearing on the propriety of the injunction eight 
days later, on November 18, and on February 11, 2015, an evidentiary 
hearing was held. R. 17, 23, 65. Several of the events described above were 
discussed at the hearing. 
Whether Mr. Barnes would be able to own and carry firearms was also 
discussed. Early on in the hearing, counsel for Mr. Barnes informed the 
district court that it was "imperative that [Mr. Barnes] be allowed to carry a 
firearm when he's out in these rural areas." R. 65:8:22-23. Later on, counsel 
asked Mr. Barnes why it was "important" to Mr. Barnes that he "'be able to 
keep [his] right to own and possess firearms," but the court sustained a 
relevance-based objection to that line of questioning. R. 65:134:5-135:10. In 
closing arguments, counsel reiterated that Mr. Carson was "simply doing 
this to try and affect [Mr. Barnes'] right to own and possess a firearm." R. 
65:170:4-6. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court held that the civil stalking 
injunction would remain in place for an additional three years, until 
February 11, 2018. R. 65:171-76. The court referred to several of the 
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incidents described above, found that Mr. Barnes "engaged in a course of 
conduct directed at [Mr. Carson]," and ultimately concluded that Mr. 
Barnes' conduct would cause "a reasonable person to fear for the safety of" 
that person's "wife and minor children." R. 65:175:15-19. 
Other than its finding that Mr. Barnes "displayed" and "brandished" 
his pistol in the presence of third parties, the court did not mention Mr. 
Barnes' ability to own or carry firearms under the terms of the injunction. R. 
65:172:21-173:6. Mr. Barnes' counsel then asked as a "point of clarification" 
whether the restriction on Mr. Barnes' ability to own a firearm applied only 
"in the State of Utah." R. 65:176:10-13. The court responded as follows: 
I, I will tell you, I'm not certain. It certainly does in 
the State of Utah. I'm not going to opine as to what 
other states may do, or what the federal government 
may consider it. And, and so I, I just, I don't have an 
answer to that question, And I don't want to say 
something that may be proven wrong hereafter. 
R. 65:176:14-19. 
Shortly after the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Carson submitted a 
proposed Civil Stalking Injunction for the district court's signature. R. 34. 
The bottom of the proposed injunction warned Mr. Barnes that "[i]t may be 
a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any 
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firearm or ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this civil stalking 
injunction is in effect." R. 37 (emphasis added). The body of the injunction, 
by contrast, left no doubt, stating that the injunction II include[ s] a restriction 
where [Mr. Barnes] shall not be permitted to own or possess a firearm." R. 
36. On the last page, alongside a section entitled II Other Orders," the 
injunction reaffirmed that Mr. Barnes "shall not be permitted to own or 
possess a firearm." R. 37. 
Mr. Barnes objected to the proposed injunction's blanket restriction on 
his right to own and possess a firearm. R. 38-39. Nonetheless, the court 
entered the injunction as it had been proposed. R. 56. Besides its finding 
that Mr. Barnes' display of his pistol was II concerning," the court did not 
. explain its decision to restrict Mr. Barnes' right to own or possess a firearm. <;; 
This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erred when it entered a civil stalking injunction 
against Mr. Barnes. To start, the court relied heavily on an incident that 
occurred on October 27, 2014, but that incident cannot comprise part of the 
11 course of conduct" of which Mr. Barnes is alleged to have engaged because 
it was not II directed at" Mr. Carson. Mr. Carson had left the property several 
11 
hours before the incident occurred. Because the October 27 incident colored 
the district court's view of the entire case, the injunction should be reversed 
and the case remanded for that reason alone. 
In addition, two of the subsequent incidents between Mr. Barnes and 
Mr. Carson involved nothing more than a landlord exercising his contractual 
rights. On November 4, Mr. Barnes was entitled to follow Mr. Carson for 
"about a mile" to ensure that nothing he was hauling away from the 
property amounted to "fixtures" that were required, under the parties' 
agreement, to remain on the property. On November 6, Mr. Barnes was 
entitled to verify Mr. Carson's residential address to ensure that the process 
of evicting Mr. Carson was consistent with state law. 
Finally, even if the Court upholds the injunction's general terms 
against Mr. Barnes, it should vacate and remove the injunction's restriction 
viJ on Mr. Barnes' right to own and carry firearms. An individual's right to own 
and carry firearms rests on the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
vJ) and Article 1, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. Under both provisions, an 
individual has the right to own and carry firearms for lawful purposes, 
,..:J including self-defense. This right is not unlimited, and both federal and 
Utah law properly restrict a person's right to own and carry firearms under 
12 
certain circumstances. But none of those circumstances are present here. 
Because there is not a federal or Utah statutory provision that prohibits Mr. 
Barnes' constitutional right to own and carry a firearm under these 
circumstances, that right may not be infringed. Thus, even if the injunction 
was properly entered as a general matter (it was not), the Court should still 
vacate and remove the injunction's restriction on Mr. Barnes' right to own 
and carry a firearm. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE INJUNCTION WAS WRONGLY ENTERED BECAUSE AT 
LEAST ONE OF THE INCIDENTS WAS NOT ''DIRECTED AT" 
MR. CARSON, AND OTHER INCIDENTS WOULD NOT CAUSE 
A REASONABLE COMMERCIAL TENANT TO BE AFRAID. 
Mr. Barnes should not be subject to a permanent injunction involving 
Mr. Carson for at least two reasons. First, the primary incident concerning 
the district court was not II directed at" Mr. Carson. Second, two of the acts 
at issue do not form part of a II course of conq.uct" that would cause a GI 
reasonable commercial tenant to be afraid. Without these acts, the injunction 
lacks an adequate statutory foundation. 
A. The October 27 Incident was not "Directed at" Mr. Carson. 
The court's conclusion to the contrary- and the entry of the injunction 
generally-was based on the incident on October 27. As described in the 
13 
Statement of Facts, Mr. Barnes had good reason, given the prevailing 
circumstances on October 27, to fear for his and his wife's safety. It was dark, 
the couple refused to tum over the locks to the gates, and the woman reached 
il).to her car without declaring her purpose in doing so. 
The court's reliance on this incident to enter an injunction against Mr. 
B~mes is a problem for a mor~ fundamental reason. The i!lcident was not 
"directed at" Mr. Carson. The first element of Utah's definition of" stalking" 
is that it be" directed at" the person who is seeking the restraining order. 
Utah Code§ 76-5-106.S(l)(b).. To "direct" an act "at" someone requires a 
person to II aim" his or her conduct toward that someone. Black's Law 
Dictionary 491 (8th ed. 2004). 
As to the events that occurred on October 27, that element remains 
unsatisfied. All agree that Mr. Carson was not on the property during the 
VJJ incident in question. He had departed four hours earlier. Confirming that 
Mr_. Barnes was not directing his acts at Mr. Carson, Mr. Barnes repeatedly 
-~ called Mr. Carson after the incident to explain what had happened. R. 
65:132:2-6; 133:6-7. The district cou·rt never explained how Mr. Barnes' 
Vi9 actions could be "directed" or II aimed" at Mr. Carson despite Mr. Carson's 
absence. In fact, although the court frequently referred to the incident that 
14 
occurred on October 27, see, e.g., 65:172:21-25, the court never expressly 
found that the October 27 incident was II directed at" Mr. Carson. R. 65:173:1. 
The court thought the incident important because Mr. Carson was 
aware of it. Mr. Carson's awareness of the incident, however, does not 
transform the incident into one II directed at" Mr. Carson. What is more, 
relying on knowledge of events in a person's past-events that are not 
11 directed at" the petitioner- to establish the II fear" required by the statute 
runs contrary to the statute's text. The statute states that II acts directed at" 
the petitioner are what constitute a" course of conduct," and that the·" course 
of conduct" is what must cause a reasonable person to fear. Utah Code§ 76-
5-106.5(2). Acts that are not II directed at" a particular petitioner, in other 
words, may not form part of the II course of conduct" that causes a reasonable 
person to fear. The district court's conclusion to the contrary demands 
reversal. 
B. A Reasonable Commercial Landlord Would Have No Reason 
to Know that the Events of November 4 and 6 Would Cause a 
Reasonable Commercial Tenant to Be Afraid. 
The acts of Mr. Barnes' that were II directed at" Mr. Carson would not 
have caused a reasonable commercial tenant to fear for himself or for third 
persons. To qualify for an injunction, a petitioner in Utah "must meet an 
15 
1..·· .• 
Vil.ii 
objective-not subjective-standard." Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 8, ,r 24, 322 
P.3d 728. This means that the petitioner must prove that the respondent's 
conduct "would cause" fear "to a reasonable person in the petitioner's 
circumstances." Id. ,r 25 ( emphasis added). As the reference to "petitioner's 
circumstances" illustrates, the inquiry is not purely objective. By taking into 
account a person's individual circums.tances, Utah's Stalking Statute 
"provides for" what the Utah Supreme Court calls "an individualized 
objective standard." Id. ,r 26 (quoting and discussing Utah Code § 76-5-
106.S(e)). In applying this standard, courts take into account, among other 
things, "the victim's knowledge of and relationship with the defendant." Id. 
,r 27. 
Here, Mr. Barnes was Mr. Carson's landlord, and the two of them were 
parties to a lease agreement involving real property. As a result of their 
.) business relationship, some level of personal contact was inevitable. Things 
had not gone smoothly. Mr. Barnes had frequently asked Mr. Carson to lock 
·,..J the gates to the property. Just as frequently, Mr. Carson had refused. Mr. 
Barnes had asked Mr. Carson to provide proof of insurance and a proper 
,J estoppel certificate. Mr. Carson had refused. It is undeniable that Mr. 
Carson's refusal to lock the gates and failure to provide proof of insurance 
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and a proper estoppel certificate produced tension in the parties' 
relationship. R. 65:172:1-2. But there is no reason for that tension to result 
in a civil stalking injunction. 
In entering the injunction, the Court emphasized events that took place 
on November 4 and 6, but on both occasions Mr. Barnes was merely carrying 
out his responsibilities as landlord. As to November 4, Mr. Barnes saw 
pickup trucks and trailers leaving the property loaded up with equipment. 
Mr. Barnes knew that, under the agreement, 11 [a]ny alterations or 
improvements to the Premises" could not be removed from the property, Pl. 
Ex. 1, ,r 10, R. 65:124:16-18, so, out of II curio[ sity ]," he and his wife followed ~ 
the pickups and trailers for about II a mile," R. 65:121:13-15. The district 
court never addressed Mr. Barnes' explanation for the November 4 incident 6 
and never explained why Mr. Barnes' actions were concerning in light of the 
parties' relationship and in light of Mr. Barnes' rights under the agreement. {v 
See Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Limited 
contact during legitimate ... encounters ... , without conduct directed at ~ 
causing physical harm or emotional distress to an intended person, does not 
fall under the statute's purview."). 
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The district court did reject Mr. Barnes' explanation for driving by Mr. 
Carson's residence, noting that he already had Mr. Carson's address" on the 
check." R. 65:174:16-17. But addresses on checks are often outdated, 
especially checks belonging to those, like Mr. Carson, who work hard to 
keep their address secret. In addition, given Mr. Carson's stubbornness and 
cantankerousness in other areas (gate-locking, insurance-providing), Mr. 
Barnes had every reason to make sure the process of eviction was done "by 
the book." Finally, the court never reconciled Mr. Carson's decision to follow 
Mr. Barnes for the next twenty or thirty minutes (despite repeated 
instructions from dispatch to stop doing so, R. 65:119:15-21; 157-63) with the 
notion that a reasonable commercial tenant would have feared for his own 
Cd) or his family's safety. In light of the parties' business relationship, the 
November 4 and 6 incidents would not have caused a reasonable 
@ commercial tenant to fear for himself or others. 
In sum, the October 27 incident was not" directed at" Mr. Carson and 
l,{j) so cannot be included in Mr. Barnes' alleged "course of conduct." In 
addition, the incidents that occurred on November 4 and 6 would not have 
~ caused a reasonable person to fear. As a result, the statute's requirement of 
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at least two acts directed at a person and likely to cause that person to fear 
is left unfulfilled, and the injunction should be reversed. 
II. THE INJUNCTION UNLAWFULLY RESTRICTS MR. BARNES' 
RIGHT-UNDER THE U.S. AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS-TO 
OWN AND CARRY A FIREARM. 
The injunction wrongly prohibits Mr. Barnes from owning or 
possessing a firearm. The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and ~ 
Article 1, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution protect a person's right to own 
and carry a firearm. This right, under both constitutions, encompasses a GJ 
person's ability to defend himself against danger and to own an~ carry 
weapons in case of confrontation. The right to own and carry weapons, w 
including firearms, is not without limits, but no such limits apply here. 
Thus, even if the injunction was properly entered, its restriction on Mr. 
Barnes' right to own and possess firearms cannot stand. 
A. The U.S. and Utah Constihttions Protect an Individual's Right 
to Own and Carry a Firearm. 
Mr. Barnes has a right under the U.S. and Utah Constitutions to own 
and carry firearms. 
The U.S. Constitution provides: "A well-regulated militia being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and ~ 
bear arms shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. Amend. II. As construed by 
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the U.S. Supreme Court, this language uguarantee[s] the individual right to 
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). As further described in a later opinion-in 
which the Second Amendment was held to apply against the States-the 
"Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for 
lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home." McDonald 
v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 (2010). 
On their facts, Heller and McDonald were limited to weapons 
restrictions in a person's abode, and the effect those restrictions had on a 
,_;; person's right to defend "hearth and home." Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; 
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3044. But of course, 11 [ c ]onfrontations are not limited 
vi> to the home." Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus, the 
right to bear arms for self-defense "is as important outside the home as 
;.J inside,'' and includes a person's right to carry arms in public. Id. at 942. 
In Utah, a person's right to own and carry firearms enjoys a similarly 
yg "impressive constitutional ... pedigree." Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 2004 UT 
62, ,r 13, 96 P.3d 950. According to the Utah Constitution, "[t]he individual 
right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of self, 
family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes 
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shall not be infringed." Utah Const. Art. I, § 6. Thus, like the U.S. 
Constitution, Utah's Constitution protects a person's "right'to keep and bear 
arms' for self-defense or any other lawful purpose." Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 2015 UT 83, ,r 26, 795 Utah Adv. Rep. 64. 
B. Federal and Utah Law Do Not Authorize Restrictions on a 
Person's Constitutional Right to Own and Carry a Firearm 
Under these Circumstances. 
Nothing in Federal or Utah law allows Mr. Barnes' right to own and 
carry firearms to be restricted under the circumstances presented here. To ~ 
be sure, the right protected by the U.S. and Utah Constitutions is not 
unlimited. Under Federal law, the right is not a right" to keep and carry any 
weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose." 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Thus, under federal law, felons, the mentally ill, 
fugitives, children, illegal aliens, dishonorably-discharged veterans, persons 
who have renounced their U.S. citizenship, and persons who are subject to 
restraining orders that involve the person's "intimate partner," among 
others, may not "possess" or "receive" any "'firearm or ammunition which 
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g). 
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Likewise, Utah law permits the legislature to II defin[e] the lawful use 
of arms." Utah Const. Art. 1, § 6. In accordance with that constitutional 
authorization, the Utah Legislature has restricted the ability of the same 
,,,) 
kinds of persons ( e.g., felons, illegal aliens, children) to own or carry 
firearms. Utah Code§§ 76-10-503(1)(a), (b), (2), (3). 
Here is the problem: Whether under Federal or Utah law, Mr. Barnes 
falls within none of these restricted categories. He is not a felon, mentally 
ill, a child, an illegal alien, or a fugitive from justice. He was not 
dishonorably discharged from the Navy and he has not renounced his U.S. 
citizenship. True, for purposes of federal law, Mr. Barnes will be subject to 
a restraining order if this Court upholds the order's validity, but because Mr. 
~ Barnes and Mr. Carson II are not now and never have been intimate partners, 
the federal restriction on firearm possession simply does not apply." Sheeran 
..;; v. Thomas, 2014 UT App 285, ,r 17, 340 P.3d 797. 
It does not matter that one of the incidents described at the hearing 
y) involved a firearm. In connection with that incident, Mr. Barnes entered a 
plea in abeyance to two charges of reckless endang~rment-both 
·-J misdemeanors. But those charges have since been dismissed, see Addendum 
B, and the overarching question remains the same: Even in light of Mr. 
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Barnes' plea, does any provision of Federal or Utah law "specifically" 
prohibit Mr. Barnes' constitutional right to own and carry firearms? Utah 
Code§ 53-Sa-102(2). The answer also remains the same: No. Because no 
. provision of law "specifically" applies under these circumstances, Mr. 
Barnes may not be denied his constitutional right to "own[], possess[]," or 
"keep[] a firearm at" his "residence, property, business, or in any vehicle 
lawfully in [his] possession or lawfully under [his] control." Id.§ 102(2)(a). 
In sum, even if the Court upholds the injunction's general terms, it 
should vacate and remove the injunction's restriction on Mr. Barnes' right to 
own and carry firearms. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Court should reverse the entry of a civil stalking 
injunction against Mr. Barnes. In the alternative, the Court should vacate and 
remove the injunction's restriction on Mr. Barnes's ability to own and carry 
firearms. 
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DATED this 19th day of October, 2015. 
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JEREMY M. SHORTS (USB 10983) 
DAVID R. TODD (USB 13884) 
LAW OFFICES OF JEREMY M. SHORTS, LLC 
P.O. Box 971233 
Orem, UT 84097 
Telephone: (80 I) 610-9879 
Fax: (801) 494-2058 
E-Mail: jeremy@utahevictionlaw.com 
Attorney for Petitioner 
The Order of Court is stated below: 
Dated: March 05t 2015 /s/ Robe 
01:14:07 PM 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, TOOELE DEPARTMENT 
TIM CARSON, 
Petitioner. 
vs. 
TOM BARNES, 
Respondent. 
CIVIL STALKING 
INJUNCTION 
Civil No. 140301827 
Judge Robert Adkins 
Petitioner (person who asked for the stalking injunction): 
Tim_ --.::C~a=r.-=s=-o.:..:.n ____ _ 
Last 
First Name Middle 
Other people protected by this order: 
Address and phone # (to keep Name Age Relationship to 
private, leave blank): 
417 Highland Drive_ 
Street 
Tooele 1 Utah 84074 
City -- State - Zip 
435-830-8022 
Phone# 
Petitioner's attorney (if any): 
Civil Stalking Injunction 
March 05, 2015 01 :14 PM 
Minor children residing 
with Petitioner 
I.C. 
--12-. 
B.C. _a_ 
Jerem't.. M. Shorts (US.B #10f1_83l Phone# 
Approved by Board of District Court Judges, June 2013 
Revised December 15, 2014 
Petitioner 
Child 
Child 
801-610-9879 
Page 1 of 4 
1 of 4 
.J 
Respondent 
(person who must obey this stalking injunction): 
Tom Barnes 
Middle 
First Name Last 
Other Names Used ________ _ 
Sex 
Male 
Eye 
Color 
Describe Respondent 
Race Date of 
Birth 
Height Weight· 
White 3/7/1942 
Hair 
Color 
Grey 
Social Security Number 
(last four digits only) 
Address Distinguishing features (scars, tattoos, limp, etc.) 
13303 Kingsride Lane 
Street 
Driver's license issued by 
Houston, TX 77079 (State): _____ Expires _____ _ 
City -- State - Zip 
Warning/ [ X J Weapon involved (Box to be marked if applicable). 
There was a hearing on (date): February 11 2015 . The Respondent was given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard in the hearing that gave rise to this order. The following people were 
present at the hearing: 
[ X] Petitioner [ X] Petitioner's attorney (name): Jeremy M. Shorts 
[ X] Respondent [ X] Respondent's attorney (name): Richard Tanner , 
[ X ] Other (name) Witnesses Stuart Burgess and Crystal Burgess 
The Court reviewed the Request for Civil Stalking Injunction and: c x J received argument and 
evidence, u accepted the stipulation of the parties, [_] entered the default of the Respondent for 
failure to appear, u other: ______ , and finds that there is reason to believe that stalking 
has occurred and that the Respondent is the stalker. (Utah Code Sect77-3a-101) 
The Court finds that Respondent made numerous visits to the leased property. 
The court understands that the lease gives Respondent some reasonable right to 
inspect the leased premises. The court finds that Respondent's actions went 
beyond that reasonable right to inspect under utah law and/or the right to inspect 
stated in the Lease (see Lease at ,r12). Respondent had previously seen Mr. & Mrs. 
Burgess on the leased property, who were legally present as either licensees, 
permitees or coworkers of Petitioner who were engaged in activity on the leased 
property for the benefit of the Petitioner. The court finds the testimony of Mr. & Mrs. 
Burgess more credible than the testimony of Respondent. Court believes that on 
October 27, 2014 and in the presence of Mr. & Mrs. Burgess, a firearm was 
Civil Stal~ing Injunction 
March 05, 2015 01 :14 PM 
Approved by Board of District Court Judges, June 2013 
Revised December 15, 2014 
Page 2 of 4 
2 of 4 
displayed by Respondent and loaded with a magazine inserted into the pistol. The. 
Court finds at a minimum that this constituted brandishing a weapon, which conduct 
is concerning. 
In reviewing Utah's stalking statute (including Utah Code Ann 77-3a-106.5), the 
Court finds that Respondent did approach or confront Petitioner at the leased 
premises and that when the Petitioner was not present he returned to the leased 
premises and contacted Mr. & Mrs. Burgess. The Court finds that Respondent also 
appeared, monitored, observed or surveiled Petitioner's residence. After hearing 
Respondent's explanation, the Court finds there was no real reason to drive by 
Petitioner's residence. 
These actions rightfully caused a concern to the Petitioner where the 
Respondent had cut a cable for the key to the generator on the property, previously 
showed a firearm, and had prior confrontations on the leased premises and 
Petitioner's home. 
The Court finds that Petitioner intentionally or knowingly engaged in a course of 
conduct directed at Petitioner and knew or should have known that the course of 
conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for the person's own safety or the 
safety of a third person (Petitioner himself, his coworkers, his wife and/or his minor 
children). The Court finds that Petitioner's stalking actions occurred on more than 
two occasions. 
The Court finds that the stalking has been established. The stalking injunction 
will continue as stated herein for a period of three years. This shall include a 
restriction where the Respondent shall not be permitted to own or possess a firearm. 
Service of this Order upon respondent shall be completed and effective through NEF 
E-Filing Notification to Respondent's counsel. 
The Respondent must obey all orders initialed by the judicial officer. These orders 
replace any previous temporary stalking injunction in this case. Violation of these orders is a 
criminal Class A Misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine. A second or 
subsequent violation can result in more severe penalties. 
1 [X] 
2 [ X] 
Personal Conduct Order 
Do not stalk the Petitioner. This means you must not follow, threaten, annoy, 
harass, or cause distress to the Petitioner. For a legal definition of stalking, see 
Utah Code, sections 76-5-106.5 and 77-3a-101. 
No Contact Order 
Do not contact, phone, text, mail, e-mail, or communicate either directly or 
indirectly in any way with the Petitioner and any person listed on page 1 of this 
order. 
Civil Stalking Injunction Approved by Board of District Court Judges. June 2013 
Revised December 15, 2014 
Page 3 of 4 
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~ 
3 [X] Stay Away Order 
Stay away from: 
[X] a. The Petitioner's current or future: l x 1 Vehicle [XJJob [XJ Home, 
premises and property (list current addresses below) 
Home address: 417 Highland Drive Tooele Utah 84074 
Shop address: 553 NQd;h 7th Street. Iooele. Utah 8~Q7 4 
Describe vehicles: 2QQ5 Ford F-350 Truck dack gre~; 2Q1 a Eord Edge 
silver; :l 996 Dodge 250 rgg. 
l 1 b. Other (specify): 
5 [X] Other Orders: Resgondent sball not be germitted to own or gossgss a firearm. 
Warnings to the Respondent: 
• Attention: This is an official court order. If you disobey this order, the court may find you in 
contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other 
crime you may have committed in disobeying this order. 
• This order is valid in all U.S. states and-territories, the District of Columbia, and tribal 
lands. If you go to another U.S. state, territory or tribal land to violate this order, a federal 
judge can send you to prison. 
• It may be a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or 
ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this civil stalking injunction is in effect. 
This order expires in three years on: ___ F ___ e ....... b ...... ru""""'a ..... ry _____ :l...... :l______ 2 ........ o ....... 1 __ a __ 
Civil Stalking Injunction 
March 05, 2015 01 :14 PM 
Month Day Year 
END OF INJUNCTION - SIGNATURE AT TOP·-----~ 
Approved by Board of District Court Judges, June 2013 
Revised December 15, 2014 
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Utah Code § 77-3a-101 
(1) As used in this chapter, "stalking" means the crime of stalking as de-
fined in Section 76-5-106.5. Stalking injunctions may not be obtained 
against law enforcement officers, governmental investigators, or licensed 
private investigators, acting in their official capacity. 
(2) Any person who believes that he or she is the victim of stalking may file 
a verified written petition for a civil stalking injunction against the alleged 
stalker with the district court in the district in which the petitioner or re-
spondent resides or in which any of the events occurred. A minor with his 
or her parent or guardian may file a petition on his or her own behalf, or a 
parent, guardian, or custodian may file a petition on the minor's behalf. 
(3) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uni-
form forms for petitions, ex parte civil stalking injunctions, civil stalking 
injunctions, service and any other necessary forms in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter on or before July 1, 2001. The office shall provide 
the forms to the clerk of each district court. 
(a) All petitior:is, injunctions, ex parte injunctions, and any other nec-
essary forms shall be issued in the form adopted by the Administrative Of-
fice of the Courts. 
(b) The offices of the court clerk shall provide the forms to persons 
seeking to proceed "!,lnder this chapter. 
(4) The petition for a civil stalking injunction shall include: 
(a) the name of the petitioner; however, the petitioner's address shall 
be disclosed to the court for purposes of service, but, on request of the peti-
tioner, the address may not be listed on the petition, and shall be protected 
and maintained in a separate document or automated database, not subject 
to release, disclosure, or any form of public access except as ordered by the 
court for good cause shown; 
(b) the name and address, if known, of the respondent; 
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(c) specific events and dates of the actions constituting the alleged 
stalking; 
(d) if there is a prior court order concerning the same conduct, the 
name of the court in which the order was rendered; and 
(e) corroborating evidence of stalking, which may be in the form of a 
police report, affidavit, record, statement, item, letter, or any other evi-
dence which tends to prove the allegation of ~talking. 
(S)(a) If the court determines that the!e is reason to believe that an of-
fense of stalking has occurred, an ex parte civil stalking injunction may be 
issued by the court that includes any of the following: 
(i) respondent may be enjoined from committing stalking; 
(ii) respondent may be restrained from coming near the resi-
dence, place of employment, or school of the other party or specifically des-
ignated locations or persons; 
(iii) respondent may be restrained from contacting, directly or 
indirectly, the other party, including personal, written or telephone contact 
with the other party, the other party's employers, employees, fellow work-
ers or others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoy-
ance or alarm to the other party; or 
(iv) any other relief necessary or convenient for the protection 
of the petitioner and other specifically designated persons under the cir-
cumstances. 
(b) If the petitioner and respondent have minor children, the court 
shall follow the provisions of Section 78B-7-106 and take into consideration 
the respondent's custody and parent-time rights while ensuring the safety 
of the victim and the minor children. If the court issues a civil stalking in-
junction, but declines to address custody and parent-time issues, a copy of 
the- stalking injunction shall be filed in any action in which custody and 
parent-time issues are being considere~. 
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(6) Within 10 days of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction, the re-
spondent is entitled to request, in writing, an evidentiary hearing on the 
civil stalking injunction. 
(a) A hearing requested by the respondent shall be held within 10 
days from the date the request is filed with the court unless the court finds 
compelling reasons to continue the hearing. The hearing shall then be held 
at the earliest possible time. The burden is on the petitioner to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that stalking of the petitioner by the re-
spondent has occurred. 
(b) An ex parte civil stalking injunction issued under this section 
shall state on its face: 
(i) that the respondent is entitled to a hearing, upon written re-
quest within 10 days of the service of the order; 
(ii) the name and address of the district court where the re-
quest may be filed; 
(iii) that if the respondent fails to request a hearing within 10 
days of service; the ex parte civil stalking injunction is automatically modi-
fied to a civil stalking injunction without further notice to the respondent 
and that the civil stalking injunction expires three years after service of the 
ex parte civil stalking injunction; and 
(iv) that if the respondent requests, in writing, a hearing after 
the ten-day period after service, the court shall set a hearing within area-
sonable time from the date requested. 
(7) At the hearing, the court may modify, revoke, or continue the injunc-
tion. The burden is on the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the ev-
idence that stalking of the petitioner by the respondent has occurred. 
(8) The ex parte civil stalking injunction and civil stalking injunction shall 
include the following statement: "Attention. This is an official court order. 
If you disobey this order, the court may find you in contempt. You may al-
so ~e arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other crime 
3 
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you may have committed in disobeying this order." 
(9) The ex parte civil stalking injunction' shall be served on the respondent 
within 90 days from the date it is signed. An ex parte civil stalking injunc-
tion is effective upon service. If no hearing is requested in writing by the 
respondent within 10 days of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunc-
tion, the ex parte civil stalking injunction automatically becomes a civil 
stalking injunction without further notice to the respondent and expires 
three years from the date of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction. 
(10) If the respondent requests a hearing after the ten-day period after ser-
vice, the court shall set a hearing within a reasonable time from the date 
requested. At the hearing, the burden is on the respondent to show good 
cause why the civil stalking injunction should be dissolved or modified. 
(11) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service has been 
returned, excluding weekends and holidays, the clerk of the court from 
which the ex parte civil stalking injunction was issued shall enter a copy of 
the ex parte civil stalking injunction and proof of service or acceptance of 
service in the statewide network for warrants or a similar system. 
(a) The effectiveness of an ex parte civil stalking injunctio~ or civil 
stalking injunction shall not depend upon its entry in the statewide system 
and, for enforcement purposes, a certified copy of an ex parte civil stalking 
injunction or civil stalking injunction is presumed to be a valid existing or-
der of the court for a period of three years from the date of service of the ex 
parte civil stalking injunction on the respondent. 
(b) Any changes or modifications of the ex parte civil stalking injunc-
tion are effective upon service on the respondent. The original ex parte civil 
stalking injunction continues in effect until service of the changed or modi-
fied civil stalking injunction on the respondent. 
(12) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service has been 
returned, excluding weekends and holidays, the clerk of the court shall en-
ter a copy of the changed or modified civil stalking injunction and proof of 
service or acceptance of service in the statewide network for warrants or a 
similar system. 
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(13) The ex parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction may 
be dissolved at any time upon application of the petitioner to the court 
which granted it. 
(14) The court clerk shall provide, without charge, to the petitioner one cer-
tified copy of the injunction issued by the court and one certified copy of 
the proof of service of the injunction on the respondent. Charges may be 
imposed by the clerk's office for any additional copies, certified or not cer-
tified in accordance with Rule 4-202.08 of the Code of Judicial Administra-
tion. 
(15) The remedies provided in this chapter for enforcement of the orders of 
the court are in addition to any other civil and criminal remedies available. 
The district court shall hear and decide all matters arising pursuant to this 
section. 
(16) After a hearing with notice to the affected party, the court may enter 
an order requiring any party to pay the costs of the action, including rea-
sonable attorney fees. 
(17) This chapter does not apply to protective orders or ex parte protective 
orders issued pursuant to Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse 
Act, or to preliminary injunctions issued pursuant to an action for dissolu-
tion of marriage or legal separation. 
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Utah Code§ 76-5-106.5 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" means: 
(i) a verdict or conviction; 
(ii) a plea of guilty or guilty and mentally ill; 
(iii) a plea of no contest; or 
(iv) the acceptance by the court of a plea in abeyance. 
(b) "Course of conduct" means two or more acts directed at or to-
ward a specific person, including: 
(i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, photo-
graphs, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about a person, or inter-
feres with a person's property: 
(A) directly, indirectly, or through any third party; and 
(B) by any action, method, device, or means; or 
(ii) when the actor engages in any of the following acts or caus-
es someone else to engage in any of these acts: 
(A) approaches or confronts a person; 
(B) appears at the person's workplace or contacts the per-
son's employer or coworkers; 
(C) appears at a person's residence or contacts a person's 
neighbors, or enters property owned, leased, or occupied by a person; 
(D) sends material by any means to the person or for the 
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purpose of obtaining or disseminating information about or communi-
cating with the person to a member of the person's family or household, 
employer, coworker, friend, or associate of the person; 
(E) places an object on or delivers an object to property 
owned, leased, or occupied by a person, or to the person's place of em-
ployment with the intent that the object be delivered to the person; or 
(F) uses a computer, the Internet, text messaging, or any 
other electronic means to commit an act that is a part of the course of con-
duct. 
(c) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any 
other person who regularly resides in the household or who regularly re-
sided in the household within the prior six months. 
(d) "Emotional distress" means significant mental or psychological suffer-
ing, whether or not medical or other professional treatment or counseling 
is required. 
(e) "Reasonable person" means a reasonable person in the victim's 
circumstances. 
(£) "Stalking" means an offense as described in Subsection (2) or (3). 
(g) "Text messaging" means a communication in the form of elec-
tronic text or one or more electronic images sent by the actor from a tele-
phone or computer to another person's telephone or computer by address-
ing the communication to the recipient's telephone number. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly engages 
in a course of conduct directed at a specific person and knows or should 
know that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person: 
(a) to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; 
or 
(b) to suffer other emotional distress. 
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(3) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates: 
(a) a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, 
Stalking Injunctions; or 
(b) a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this 
section. 
(4) In any prosecution under this section, it is not a defense that the actor: 
(a) was not given actual notice that the course of conduct was un-
wanted; or 
(b) did not intend to cause the victim fear or other emotional dis-
tress. 
(5) An offense of stalking may be prosecuted under this section in any ju-
risdiction where one or more of the acts that is part of the course of conduct 
was initiated or caused an effect on the victim. 
(6) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor: 
(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or 
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to 
Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions. 
(7) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender: 
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted in another jurisdiction of an of-
fense that is substantially similar to the offense of stalking; 
( c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of 
any crime in another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a 
felony, in which the victim of the stalking offense or a member of the vic-
tim's immediate family was also a victim of the previous felony offense; 
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(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursu-
ant to Subsection (9); or 
(e) has been or is at the time of the offense a cohabitant, as defined in 
Section 78B-7-102, of the victim. 
(8) Stalking is a second degree felony if the offender: 
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or used 
other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in the 
commission of the crime of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of 
stalking; · 
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or 
jurisdictions of offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of stalk-
ing; 
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of of-
fenses under Subsection (7)(a), (b), or (c); · 
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony of-
fenses in Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if 
committed in Utah, would be felonies, in which the victim of the stalking 
was also a victim of the previous felony offenses; or 
(f) has been previously convicted of an offense under Subsection 
(7)( d) or ( e). 
(9)(a) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in 
abeyance for a period of time serves as an application for a permanent 
criminal stalking injunction limiting the contact between the defendant and 
the victim. 
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued by the court at 
the time of the conviction. The court shall give the defendant notice of the 
right to request a hearing. 
9 
4827-6090-8585. VI 
(c) If the defendant requests a hearing under Subsection (9)(b), it 
shall be held at the time of the conviction unless the victim requests other-
wise, or for good cause. 
(d) If the conviction was entered in a justice court, a certified copy of 
the judgment and conviction or a certified copy of the court's order holding 
the plea in abeyance shall be filed by the victim in the district court as an 
application and request for a hearing for a permanent criminal stalking in-
junction. 
(10) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued by the dis-
trict court granting the following relief where appropriate: 
(a) an order: 
(i) restraining the defendant from entering the residence, prop-
erty, school, or place of employment of the victim; and 
(ii) requiring the defendant to stay away from .the victim, ex-
cept as provided in Subsection (11), and to stay away from any specified 
place that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by the victi~; 
(b) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with or 
regarding the victim, including an order forbidding the defendant from 
personally or through an agent initiating any communication, except as 
provided in Subsection (11), likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the vic-
tim, including personal, written, or telephone contact with or regarding the 
victim, with the victim's employers, employees, coworkers, friends, associ-
ates, or others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoy-
ance or alarm to the victim; and 
(c) any other orders the court considers necessary to protect the vic-
tim and members of the victim's immediate family or household. 
10 
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(11) If the victim and defendant have minor children together, the court 
may consider provisions regarding the defendant's exercise of custody and 
parent-time rights while ensuring the safety of the victim and any minor 
children. If the court issues a permanent criminal stalking injunction, but 
declines to address custody and parent-time issues, a copy of the stalking 
injunction shall be filed in any action in which custody and parent-time is-
sues are being considered and that court may modify the injunction to bal-
ance the parties' custody and parent-time rights. 
(12) Except as provided in Subsection (11 ), a permanent criminal stalking 
injunction may be modified, dissolved, or dismissed only upon application 
of the victim to the court which granted the injunction. 
(13) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant to 
this section shall be sent by the court to the statewide warrants network or 
similar system. 
(14) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this sec-
tion has effect statewide. 
(15)(a) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant tq this section constitutes 
a third degree felony offense of stalking under Subsection (7). 
(b) Violations may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalk-
ing victim, a criminal action initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both. 
(16) This section does not preclude the filing of a criminal information for 
stalking based on the same act which is the basis for the violation of the 
stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunc-
tions, or a permanent criminal stalking injunction. 
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Utah Const. Art. 1, § 6 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other 
lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the 
Legislature from defining the lawful use of arms. 
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Utah Code § 53-5a~102 
§ 53-5a-102. Uniform firearm laws 
(1) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally pro-
tected right under Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution, the Legisla-
ture finds the need to provide uniform civil and criminal firearm laws 
throughout the state. 
(2) Except as specifically provided by state law, a local authority or state 
entity may not: 
(a) prohibit an individual from owning, possessing, purchasing, sell-
ing, transferring, transporting, or keeping a firearm at the individual's 
place of residence, property, business, or in any vehicle lawfully in the in-
dividual's possession or lawfully under the individual's control; or 
(b) require an individual to have a permit or license to purchase, 
own, possess, transport, or keep a firearm. 
(3) In conjunction with Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons, this section is 
uniformly applicable throughout this state and in all its political subdivi-
sions and municipalities. 
( 4) All authority to regulate firearms is reserved to the state except where 
the Legislature specifkally delegates responsibility to local authorities or 
state entities. 
(5) Unless specifically authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local au-
thority or state entity may not enact, establish, or enforce any ordinance, 
regulation, rule, or policy pertaining to firearms that in any way inhibits or 
restricts the possession or use of firearms on either public or private prop-
erty. 
(6) As used in this section: 
4 82 7-6090-85 85. V I 
(a) "firearm" has the same meaning as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
and 
(b) "local authority or state entity" includes public school districts, 
public schools, and state institutions of higher education. 
(7) Nothing in this section restricts or expands private property rights. 
14 
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Utah Code § 76-10-503 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Sec-
tion 76-3-203.5; 
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony; 
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 
62A-7-101; 
(iv) within the last 10 years has been adjudicated delinquent 
for an offense which if committed by an adult would have been a violent 
felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5; 
(v) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United 
States; or 
(vi) is on probation for a conviction of possessing: 
(A) a substance classified in Section 58-37-4 as a Sched-
ule I or II controlled substance; 
(B) a controlled substance analog; or 
(C) a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2. 
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony; 
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delin-
quent for an offense which if committed by an adult would have been a 
felony; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined 
in Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly 
4827-6090-8585.V I 
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and intentionally in unlawful possession of a Schedule I or II controlled 
substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
( v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felo-
ny offense; 
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a 
felony offense; · 
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided 
in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (1993),1 or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(viii) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forc-
es; or 
(ix) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen 
of the United States. 
(c) As used in this section, a conviction of a felony or adjudication 
of delinquency for an offense which would be a felony if committed by an 
adult does not include: 
(i) a conviction or adjudication of delinquency for an offense 
pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraint of trade, 
or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices 
not involving theft or fraud; or 
(ii) a conviction or adjudication of delinquency which, ac-
cording to the law of the jurisdiction in which it occurred, has been ex-
punged, set aside, reduced to a misdemeanor by court order, pardoned or 
regarding which the person's civil rights have been restored unless the 
pardon, reduction, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly 
provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive fire-
arms. 
( d) It is the burden of the defendant in a criminal case to provide 
evidence that a conviction or adjudication of delinquency is subject to an 
exception provided in Subsection (l)(c), after which it is the burden of the 
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conviction or adjudica-
16 
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tion of delinquency is not subject to that exception . 
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, 
consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have 
under the person's custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly 
purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or 
control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(3) A Category II restricted person who intentionally or knowingly pur-
chases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or 
control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor. 
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the 
same time. 
(5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in an-
other section for one who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has un-
der this custody or control any dangerous weapon, the penalties of that 
section control. 
(6) It is an affirmative defense to a charge based on the definition in Sub-
section (l)(b)(iv) that the person was: 
(a) in possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a lawful or-
der of a practitioner for use of a member of the person's household or for 
administration to an animal owned by the person or a member of the per-
son's household; or 
(b) otherwise authorized by law to possess the substance. 
17 
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(7)(a) It is an affirmative defense to transferring a firearm or other dan-
gerous weapon by a person restricted under Subsection (2) or (3) that the 
firearm or dangerous weapon: 
(i) was possessed by the person or was under the person's 
custody or control before the person became a restricted person; 
(ii) was not used in or possessed during the commission of a 
crime or subject to disposition under Section 24-3-103; 
(iii) is not being held as evidence by a court or law enforce-
ment agency; 
(iv) was transferred to a person not legally prohibited from 
possessing the weapon; and 
(v) unless a different time is ordered by the court, was trans-
ferred within 10 days of the person becoming a restricted person. 
(b) Subsection (7)(a) is not a defense to the use, purchase, or posses-
sion on the person of a firearm or other dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person. 
(8)(a) A person may not sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any firearm 
or dangerous weapon to any person, knowing that the recipient is a per-
son described in Subsection (l)(a) or (b). 
(b) A person who violates Subsection (8)(a) when the recipient is: 
(i) a person described in Subsection (l)(a) and the transaction 
involves a firearm, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a person described in Subsection (l)(a) and the transaction 
involves any dangerous weapon other than a firearm, and the transferor 
has knowledge that the recipient intends to use the weapon for any un-
lawful purpose, is guilty of a third degree felony; 
(iii) a person described in Subsection (l)(b) and the transac-
tion involves a firearm, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
18 
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(iv) a person described in Subsection (l)(b) and the transac-
tion involves any dangerous weapon other than a firearm, and the trans-
feror has knowledge that the recipient intends to use the weapon for any 
unlawful purpose, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(9)(a) A person may not knowingly solicit, persuade, encourage or entice 
a dealer or other person to sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of a firearm 
or dangerous weapon under circumstances which the person knows 
would be a violation of the law. 
(b) A person may not provide to a dealer or other person any in-
formation that the person knows to be materially false information with 
intent to deceive the dealer or other person about the legality of a sale, 
transfer or other disposition of a firearm or dangerous weapon. 
(c) 11 Materially false information" means information that portrays 
an illegal transaction as legal or a legal transaction as illegal. 
, 
( d) A person who violates this Subsection (9) is guilty of: 
(i) a third degree felony if the transaction involved a firearm; 
or 
(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the transaction involved a dan-
gerous weapon other than a firearm. 
19 
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United States Const. Amend. II 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
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18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g) 
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person--
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 
(2) who is a fugitive from justice; 
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled sub-
stance ( as defined in section 1 Q~ __ of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
u.s.c. 802)); 
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been 
committed to a mental institution; 
(5) who, being an alien--
(A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or 
(B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted 
to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is de-
fined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. 1101(a)(26))); 
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishon-
orable conditions; 
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced 
his citizenship; 
(8) who is subject to a court order that--
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received 
actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to par-
ticipate; 
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threat-
ening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate 
partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an 
intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or 
21 
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child; and 
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credi-
ble threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or 
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that 
would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; or 
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence, 
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or af-
fecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm 
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - TG0'ELE 
TOOELE COUNTY, S'F-1tTE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. TOM BARNES 
CASE NUMBER 141300512 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-5-112 - RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT 3rd Degree Felony 
(amended) to Class A Misdemeanor 
Offense Date: October 27, 2014 
Plea: December 23, 2014 Guilty 
Disposition: June 19, 2015 Dismissed (w/o prej) 
Charge 2 - 76-5-112 - RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT 3rd Degree Felony 
(amended) to Class A Misdemeanor 
Offense Date: October 27, 2014 
Plea: December 23, 2014 Guilty 
Disposition: June 19, 2015 Dismissed (w/o prej) 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
ROBERT ADKINS 
PARTIES 
Defendant - TOM BARNES 
Represented by: GARY K SEARLE 
Represented by: RICHARD TANNER 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: GARY K SEARLE 
Bondsman - REBEL BAIL BOND INC 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: TOM BARNES 
Offense tracking number: 46278495 
Date of Birth: March 07, 1942 
Law Enforcement Agency: TOOELE COUNTY SHERIF 
LEA Case Number: 46278495 
Prosecuting Agency: TOOELE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 141408746 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
viJ TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 1,000.00 
Amount Paid: 1,000.00 
Printed: 07/27/15 16:35:01 Page 1 
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i~ 
CASE NUMBER 141300512 State Felony 
Credit: 
Balance: 
PAPER BOND TOTALS Posted: 
Forfeited: 
Exonerated: 
Balance: 
0.00 
0.00 
8,055.00 
0.00 
8,055.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COURT COSTS 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
0.00 
0.00 
NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety 
Posted By: REBEL BAIL BOND INC (#53780) 
Posted: 
Forfeited: 
Exonerated: 
Balance: 
PROCEEDINGS 
10-29-14 Filed: INFORMATION/INDICTMENT 
10-29-14 Case filed 
10-29-14 Filed: From an Information 
10-29-14 Judge ROBERT ADKINS assigned. 
10-29-14 Filed: TCSO PC Statement 
8,055.00 
0.00 
8,055.00 
0.00 
10-29-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
10.-29-14 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on November 03, 2014 at 10:28 AM 
in Room 221 with Judge ADKINS. 
,.:i) 11-03-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for INITIAL APPEARANCE 
Judge: ROBERT ADKINS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: nancyw 
Prosecutor: SEARLE, GARY K 
Defendant not present 
Audio 
Tape Count: 10:50 
HEARING 
Printed: 07/27/15 16:35:01 Page 2 
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CASE NUMBER 141300512 State Felony 
Defendant failed to appear for hearing, he bonded out of the 
Mr. S~arle with verify with the jail the date he was given to 
appear, and he will notifiy the court. 
11-03-14 Note: ***The jail gave the defendant the date of 11-17-14 to 
appear for court, per the county attorney*** 
11-03-14 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on November 17, 2014 at 10:28 AM 
in Room 221 with Judge ADKINS. 
jail, 
~ 11-11-14 Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance 
11-11-14 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
11-17-14 ROLL CALL scheduled on December 23, 2014 at 01:30 PM in Room 
221 with Judge ADKINS. 
11-17-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance 
Judge: 
PRESENT 
Clerk: 
ROBERT ADKINS 
nancyw 
Prosecutor: SEARLE, GARY K 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): TANNER, RICHARD 
Audio 
Tape Count: 11:34 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
The Information is read. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
The defendant is advised of right to counsel. 
Defendant advised he is not to posses or carry a firearm while this 
felony case is pending. If he does, he could be charged with 
another felony. 
ROLL CALL is scheduled. 
Date: 12/23/2014 
Time : o 1 : 3 o p . m . 
Location: Room 221 
TOOELE COURTS COMPLEX 
74 SOUTH 100 EAST 
TOOELE, UT 84074 
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CASE NUMBER 141300512 State Felony 
Before Judge: ROBERT ADKINS 
11-17-14 Filed: notice of hearing 
11-25-14 Filed: REBEL BAIL BOND INC 8055.00 
11-25-14 Bond Account created Total Due: 
11-25-14 Bond Posted Non-Monetary Bond: 
12-23-14 Filed: amended information 
8055.00 
8,055.00 
12-23-14 Filed: statement of defendant entering a guilty plea 
12-23-14 Bond Exonerated 
12-23-14 
12-23-14 
12-23-14 
12-23-14 
12-23-14 
12-23-14 
Charge 
Charge 
Charge 
Charge 
Charge 
Minute 
Judge: 
PRESENT 
1 Disposition is Plea in abeyanc 
1 amended to Class A Misdemeanor 
2 amended to Class A Misdemeanor 
2 Disposition is Guilty 
2 Disposition is Plea in abeyanc 
Entry - Plea in abeyance 
ROBERT ADKINS 
Clerk: nancyw 
Prosecutor: SEARLE, GARY K 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney{s): TANNER, RICHARD 
Audio 
Tape Count: 2:03 
Change of Plea Note 
-8,055.00 
On states motion defendant pled guilty to amended counts 1 and 2 of 
reckless endangerment, both MA to be held in abeyance rather than 
agg assault both F3. 
PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
Defendant's plea is held in abeyance. 
PLEA IN ABEYANCE ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS 
Guilty plea held in abeyance for 6 months. Conditons: No further 
violations, pay fees in full 
Tracking review date for Plea in Abeyance: 06/23/2015 
The defendant is ordered to pay the fee of 1000.00 for COURT COSTS. 
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CASE NUMBER 141300512 State Felony 
Pay fine to The Court. This can be paid online at: 
www.utcourts.gov/payments. 
12-23-14 Fee Account created Total Due: 1000.00 
12-23-14 COURT COSTS Payment Received: 1,000.00 
01-02-15 Filed order: plea in abeyance, sentence, judgment, commitment 
Judge ROBERT ADKINS 
Signed January 02, 2015 
06-19-15 Charge 1 Disposition is Dismissed (w/o 
06-19-15 Charge 2 Dis~osition is Dismissed (w/o 
06-19-15 Case Closed 
Disposition Judge is ROBERT ADKINS 
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